Pluie de feu: Rapport de Human Rights Watch concernant les bombes au phosphore blanc lancées sur Gaza par Israël

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L'utilisation de phosphore blanc par Israël constitue une preuve de crimes de guerre
Les tirs répétés par Israël d'obus au phosphore blanc sur des zones densément peuplées de la bande de Gaza lors de sa récente opération militaire étaient indiscriminés et constituent une preuve de crimes de guerre, selon un rapport de Human Rights Watch publié le 25 mars 2009.
Ce rapport de 71 pages, intitulé « Rainof Fire: Israel's Unlawful Use of White Phosphorus in Gaza » (« Une pluie de feu : l'utilisation illégale de phosphore blanc par Israël à Gaza ») rassemble des témoignages sur les effets dévastateurs des armes au phosphore blanc sur les civils et les propriétés civiles à Gaza. Les chercheurs de Human Rights Watch à Gaza ont trouvé, immédiatement après la fin des hostilités, des éclats d'obus, des fragments de réceptacles et des douzaines de morceaux de feutre brûlé contenant des résidus de phosphore blanc dans les rues, sur les toits des bâtiments, dans les jardins résidentiels, et dans une école des Nations unies. Le rapport fournit également des preuves balistiques, des photographies et des images satellites, ainsi que des documents provenant de l'armée et du gouvernement israéliens.
Les armées de divers pays utilisent essentiellement le phosphore blanc pour masquer leurs opérations sur le terrain en créant une épaisse fumée. Il est aussi utilisé comme arme incendiaire.
« A Gaza, l'armée israélienne n'a pas simplement utilisé le phosphore blanc dans des zones ouvertes en tant qu'écran pour dissimuler ses troupes », a déclaré Fred Abrahams, chercheur de la division Urgences au sein de Human Rights Watch et co-auteur du rapport. « Elle a tiré des obus au phosphore blanc de manière répétée sur des zones densément peuplées, même lorsque ses troupes n'étaient pas présentes dans la zone et lorsque d'autres écrans de fumée, plus sûrs, étaient disponibles. En conséquence, des civils ont souffert inutilement et certains ont été tués. »
Le rapport documente une tendance voire une politique d'utilisation du phosphore blanc qui, selon Human Rights Watch, aurait nécessité l'approbation d'officiers militaires supérieurs.
« Les officiers supérieurs doivent rendre des comptes pour les morts inutiles causées par le phosphore blanc », a déclaré M. Abrahams.
Le 1er février, Human Rights Watch a soumis des questions détaillées aux Forces israéliennes de défense (FID) à propos de leur utilisation de phosphore blanc à Gaza. Les FID n'ont apporté aucune réponse, citant une enquête interne en cours de réalisation par le Commandement du Sud.
Lors des récentes opérations à Gaza, les forces israéliennes ont fréquemment utilisé du phosphore blanc dans des munitions de 155 mm dans et autour de zones densément peuplées. Chaque munition répand 116 morceaux de phosphore blanc dans un rayon pouvant aller jusqu'à 125 mètres à partir du point d'explosion. Le phosphore blanc s'enflamme au contact de l'oxygène, et continue de brûler à une température pouvant atteindre 816 degrés Celsius (1 500 degrés Fahrenheit) jusqu'à ce qu'il n'en reste plus rien ou que la source d'oxygène soit coupée. En cas de contact avec la peau, le phosphore blanc crée des brûlures intenses et persistantes.
Utilisées correctement dans des zones ouvertes, les munitions au phosphore blanc ne sont pas illégales. Toutefois le rapport de Human Rights Watch conclut que les FID les ont utilisées de manière répétée et illégale au dessus de quartiers résidentiels, tuant et blessant des civils et endommageant des structures civiles, y compris une école, un marché, un entrepôt d'aide humanitaire et un hôpital.
Israël a tout d'abord nié l'utilisation de phosphore blanc à Gaza mais, devant les preuves du contraire, a déclaré utiliser toutes ses armes en accord avec le droit international. Par la suite, les autorités ont annoncé la mise en place d'une enquête interne sur d'éventuelles utilisations irrégulières de phosphore blanc.
« Les enquêtes menées par le passé par les FID sur des accusations d'actions illégales suggèrent qu'une telle enquête ne sera ni approfondie, ni impartiale », a déclaré M. Abrahams. « C'est pourquoi une enquête internationale est nécessaire pour déterminer les violations des lois de la guerre par toutes les parties au conflit. »
Les FID savaient que le phosphore blanc représente un danger pour la vie des civils, a déclaré Human Rights Watch. Un rapport médical réalisé pendant les récentes hostilités par le Ministère israélien de la Santé indique que le phosphore blanc « peut entrainer des blessures graves et la mort lorsqu'il est mis en contact avec la peau, inhalé ou avalé. » Des brûlures sur moins de dix pour cent du corps peuvent être fatales en raison des dommages causés au foie, aux reins et au cœur, selon le rapport du ministère. Les infections sont communes et l'absorption par le corps de la substance chimique peut gravement endommager les organes internes voire causer la mort.
Si le but des FID était de se servir du phosphore blanc pour former des écrans de fumée dissimulant leurs troupes, elles disposaient d'une alternative toute trouvée au phosphore blanc - des écrans de fumée produits par une entreprise israélienne, a conclu Human Rights Watch.
Tous les obus au phosphore blanc retrouvés par Human Rights Watch ont été fabriqués aux Etats-Unis en 1989 par Thiokol Aerospace, entreprise qui dirigeait alors le fonctionnement de l'usine de munitions de l'Armée en Louisiane. Le 4 janvier, Reuters a photographié des unités d'artillerie des FID manipulant des projectiles qui portaient des inscriptions indiquant qu'elles avaient été produites aux Etats-Unis dans l'Arsenal de Pine Bluff en septembre 1991.
Pour expliquer le nombre élevé de victimes civiles à Gaza, les officiers israéliens ont accusé à plusieurs reprises le Hamas d'avoir utilisé ces civils comme « boucliers humains » et d'avoir combattu dans des zones civiles. Dans les cas documentés dans ce rapport, Human Rights Watch n'a pas trouvé de preuves d'utilisation par le Hamas de civils comme « boucliers humains » au moment et à proximité des attaques. Dans certaines zones, des combattants palestiniens étaient présents mais cela ne peut justifier l'utilisation indiscriminée de phosphore blanc dans une zone habitée.
Human Rights Watch a conclu, pour de multiples raisons, que les FID ont de manière délibérée ou imprudente utilisé des armes au phosphore blanc en violation des lois de la guerre. Premièrement, l'utilisation répétée d'armes au phosphore blanc explosant au contact de l'air dans des zones habitées jusqu'aux derniers jours de l'opération révèle une pratique ou une politique délibérée plutôt qu'une utilisation fortuite ou accidentelle. Deuxièmement, les FID étaient tout à fait conscientes des effets du phosphore blanc et des dangers auxquels cette arme expose les civils. Troisièmement, les FID ont refusé d'utiliser des alternatives plus sûres pour créer des écrans de fumée.
Les lois de la guerre obligent les Etats à enquêter de manière impartiale sur les accusations de crimes de guerre. Les preuves disponibles à ce jour doivent pousser Israël à enquêter et à poursuivre de manière appropriée les personnes ayant ordonné ou perpétré des attaques illégales avec des armes au phosphore blanc, a déclaré Human Rights Watch.
Le gouvernement des Etats-Unis, qui a fourni à Israël ses munitions au phosphore blanc, doit également conduire une enquête de façon à déterminer si Israël a utilisé cette arme en violation des lois de la guerre, a également déclaré Human Rights Watch.
Source : Human Rights Watch (HRW)

I. Summary

This report documents Israel's extensive use of white phosphorus munitions during its 22-day military operations in Gaza, from December 27, 2008 to January 18, 2009, named Operation Cast Lead. Based on in-depth investigations in Gaza, the report concludes that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) repeatedly exploded white phosphorus munitions in the air over populated areas, killing and injuring civilians, and damaging civilian structures, including a school, a market, a humanitarian aid warehouse and a hospital.
White phosphorus munitions did not kill the most civilians in Gaza – many more died from missiles, bombs, heavy artillery, tank shells, and small arms fire – but their use in densely populated neighborhoods, including downtown Gaza City, violated international humanitarian law (the laws of war), which requires taking all feasible precautions to avoid civilian harm and prohibits indiscriminate attacks.
The unlawful use of white phosphorus was neither incidental nor accidental. It was repeated over time and in different locations, with the IDF "air-bursting" the munition in populated areas up to the last days of its military operation. Even if intended as an obscurant rather than as a weapon, the IDF's repeated firing of air-burst white phosphorus shells from 155mm artillery into densely populated areas was indiscriminate and indicates the commission of war crimes.
The dangers posed by white phosphorus to civilians were well-known to Israeli commanders, who have used the munition for many years. According to a medical report prepared during the hostilities by the ministry of health, "[w]hite phosphorus can cause serious injury and death when it comes into contact with the skin, is inhaled or is swallowed." The report states that burns on less than 10 percent of the body can be fatal because of damage to the liver, kidneys and heart.
When it wanted an obscurant for its forces, the IDF had a readily available and non-lethal alternative to white phosphorus-smoke shells produced by an Israeli company. The IDF could have used those shells to the same effect and dramatically reduced the harm to civilians.
Using white phosphorus in densely populated areas as a weapon is even more problematic. Human Rights Watch found no evidence that Israeli forces fired ground-burst white phosphorous at hardened military targets, such as Palestinian fighters in bunkers, but it may have air-burst white phosphorous for its incendiary effect. Fired from artillery and air-burst to maximize the area of impact, white phosphorous munitions will not have the same lethal effect as high-explosive shells, but will be just as indiscriminate.
The IDF's deliberate or reckless use of white phosphorus munitions is evidenced in five ways. First, to Human Rights Watch's knowledge, the IDF never used its white phosphorus munitions in Gaza before, despite numerous incursions with personnel and armor. Second, the repeated use of air-burst white phosphorus in populated areas until the last days of the operation reveals a pattern or policy of conduct rather than incidental or accidental usage. Third, the IDF was well aware of the effects white phosphorus has and the dangers it can pose to civilians. Fourth, if the IDF used white phosphorus as an obscurant, it failed to use available alternatives, namely smoke munitions, which would have held similar tactical advantages without endangering the civilian population. Fifth, in one of the cases documented in this report – the January 15 strike on the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) headquarters in Gaza City – the IDF kept firing white phosphorus despite repeated warnings from UN personnel about the danger to civilians. Under international humanitarian law, these circumstances demand the independent investigation of the use of white phosphorus and, if warranted, the prosecution of all those responsible for war crimes.
The IDF at first denied using white phosphorus in Gaza, and then said it was using all weapons in compliance with international law. It now says it is conducting an investigation, reportedly run by a colonel, into the use of white phosphorus. Given the IDF's record on previous internal investigations, and the relatively low rank of the reported investigation leader, the inquiry's objectivity remains in doubt.
White Phosphorus Use in Gaza
White phosphorus is a chemical substance dispersed in artillery shells, bombs, rockets, or mortars, used primarily to obscure military operations on the ground. When released upon ground contact or air-burst, it emits a dense white smoke that militaries use to screen the movement of troops. The smoke also interferes with infra-red optics and weapon-tracking systems, thus protecting military forces from guided weapons such as anti-tank guided missiles. Its use in open areas is permissible under international law, but air-bursting white phosphorus over populated areas is unlawful because it places civilians at unnecessary risk and its wide dispersal of burning wedges may amount to an indiscriminate attack.
White phosphorus can also be used as a weapon against hardened military targets, such as bunkers. However, it may not be used as an anti-personnel weapon when a weapon less likely to cause unnecessary suffering is available.
White phosphorus is not considered a chemical weapon and is not banned per se. But like all weapons its use is restricted by the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law: it must be used in a manner that adequately distinguishes between combatants and civilians, and it may never target the latter.
In Gaza, the IDF most frequently air-burst white phosphorus in 155mm artillery shells. Each air-burst spread 116 burning white phosphorus wedges in a radius extending up to 125 meters from the blast point, depending on conditions and the angle of attack.
White phosphorus ignites and burns on contact with oxygen, and continues burning at up to 1500 degrees Fahrenheit (816 degrees Celsius) until nothing is left or the oxygen supply is cut. When white phosphorus comes into contact with skin it creates intense and persistent burns, sometimes to the bone. Infection is common and the body's absorption of the chemical can cause serious damage to internal organs, as well as death.
In its Gaza operations, the IDF apparently used white phosphorus in three ways. First, on at least three occasions the IDF air-burst white phosphorus in densely populated areas. In the crowded Gaza City neighborhood of Tel al-Hawa, for example, Israeli forces on January 15 fired air-burst white phosphorus directly over homes and apartment buildings where civilians were living or taking shelter, killing at least four civilians from one family. On that day, white phosphorus shells struck the al-Quds Hospital and its administration building run by the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, setting parts of the hospital on fire and forcing the evacuation of about 50 patients and 500 neighborhood residents who had taken refuge there.
Also on January 15, at least three white phosphorus shells struck the main UNRWA compound in the Rimal neighborhood of central Gaza City, wounding three and starting fires that gutted four buildings and destroyed more than US$3.7 million worth of medical supplies. According to UNRWA officials, they had been speaking with IDF officers throughout the morning as the shells landed progressively closer to the compound, asking them to halt fire. About 700 civilians were sheltering in the UN compound at the time.
At another well-marked UN facility – a school in Beit Lahiya sheltering roughly 1,600 displaced persons – the IDF air-burst at least three white phosphorus shells on January 17, the day before the cessation of major hostilities. One discharged shell landed in a classroom, killing two brothers who were sleeping and severely injuring their mother and a cousin. The attack wounded another 12 people and set a classroom on fire. As with all of its facilities in Gaza, the UN had provided the IDF with the GPS coordinates of the school prior to military operations.
In the attacks on the UNRWA compound and the UN Beit Lahiya school, Human Rights Watch's investigation revealed no military justification for using white phosphorus as an obscurant because Israeli forces were not on the ground in those areas at the time of the attacks. When queried by Human Rights Watch by letter about these incidents, the IDF declined to respond, citing its ongoing investigation.
Second, the IDF used air-burst white phosphorus on the edges of populated areas, perhaps as an obscurant to mask the movement of its forces. In some of these cases, such as in Siyafa village near Beit Lahiya on January 4 and Khuza'a village east of Khan Yunis on January 10 and 13, substantial amounts of white phosphorus landed up to a few hundred meters inside residential areas, killing at least six civilian and wounding dozens. The use of white phosphorus in these residential areas violated the obligation to take all feasible measures during military operations to minimize civilian harm.
Third, the IDF apparently used air-burst white phosphorus in open areas along the 1948 armistice line separating Israel and Gaza, perhaps to screen troop movements and to burn shrubs and trees that might serve as cover for Palestinian armed groups, as well as to set off landmines and improvised explosive devices. Human Rights Watch was not able to investigate whether this use resulted in the destruction of civilian objects in excess of the expected military gain because security concerns prohibited travel to the area.
In all of these cases, if smoke-screening was the intended aim, then the IDF possessed alternatives to the highly incendiary white phosphorus; namely, 155mm smoke projectiles, which produce the equivalent visual screening properties without the incendiary and destructive effects. Smokescreens generated by smoke artillery can be deployed more easily over a wider area than white phosphorus with no risk of fires or burns to civilians. Israel Military Industries (IMI) manufactures such shells. While smoke shells do not block infra-red optics and weapon-tracking systems, the IDF consistently used white phosphorus during the day, obviating the need to block night vision, and Human Rights Watch found no evidence that Hamas fired anti-tank guided missiles. Even if Israeli soldiers or armor in need of cover had been on the ground in the areas where white phosphorus was used, air-bursting the munition creates a less effective smokescreen than ground-bursts because the smoke is more widely dispersed. Ground-burst white phosphorus, targeted properly, is less likely to harm civilians because the burning wedges stay more contained.
The consistent use of air-burst white phosphorus instead of smoke projectiles, especially where no Israeli forces were on the ground, strongly suggests that the IDF was not using the munition for its obscurant qualities, but rather for its incendiary effect. Indeed, Human Rights Watch is not aware of the IDF using its white phosphorus in Gaza before, despite numerous incursions with personnel and armor.
In order to explain the high number of civilian casualties from the fighting in Gaza, Israeli government and IDF officials have repeatedly blamed Hamas for using civilians as "human shields" and for fighting from civilian objects. In the cases documented in this report, Human Rights Watch found no evidence of Hamas using human shields in the vicinity at the time of the attacks. In some areas Palestinian fighters appear to have been present, such as in Khuza'a and the Tel al-Hawa neighborhood of Gaza City, but this does not justify the indiscriminate use of white phosphorus in a populated area.
Human Rights Watch has long criticized the IDF for firing 155mm high explosive shells into or near densely populated areas as indiscriminate attacks in violation of the laws of war. Using the same artillery to fire air-burst white phosphorus munitions, which send burning phosphorus wedges 125 meters in all directions, is similarly unlawful when used in populated areas.
The total number of Palestinians killed and injured by white phosphorus is not known and will likely remain so. Hospitals in Gaza were unable to provide statistics on white phosphorus casualties because they lacked the diagnostic tools to determine the cause of burns. Medical records from the time are also poor because hospitals were overwhelmed by the numbers of injured and dead.
Still, the serious impact on civilians and civilian objects is clear. In the six cases documented in this report alone, which represent a selection of white phosphorus attacks in Gaza, white phosphorus shells, burning white phosphorus wedges, or the resulting fires killed 12 civilians, including three women and seven children, one of them a fifteen-month-old baby. Dozens were wounded by burns or smoke inhalation. Human Rights Watch encountered cases of civilians who were injured from stepping on white phosphorus remains up to 12 days after major hostilities had stopped.
Palestinian and foreign doctors who treated burn victims told Human Rights Watch about seeing intense and very deep burns. On some occasions the wounds began to burn again when cleaned, which is consistent with white phosphorus igniting on contact with oxygen. "For the first time I'm seeing strange kinds of burns, very deep to the bone," one doctor at al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City told Human Rights Watch. "And they cause a bacterial infection unlike anything else."
Some seriously burned patients were evacuated to Egypt for treatment, especially if they needed skin grafts, because Gazan hospitals could not offer proper care. "We have a lot of burns, actually chemical burns," a doctor in Cairo treating Gazans told Human Rights Watch. "Most are third degree burns, which look like chemical burns and not ordinary burns. There is no skin and sometimes even no muscle."
During eleven days of research from January 21 to 31, 2009, Human Rights Watch researchers found 24 spent white phosphorus 155mm shells in civilian areas of Gaza, apparently in the places where they had fallen, including in homes and on streets in residential neighborhoods. The shells and the canisters they contained were colored a distinctive light green, which identifies them as having held white phosphorus.
Palestinian de-miners showed Human Rights Watch an additional 48 shells that they said they had removed from civilian areas, although the precise location where they found these shells is unclear. It is unlikely that the de-miners collected any of these shells from open areas near the Gaza-Israel armistice line due to the security concerns of entering those areas; Israeli forces have repeatedly opened fire on anyone who gets within a few hundred meters of Israeli territory.
Human Rights Watch also found canister liners and dozens of burnt felt wedges containing white phosphorus on streets, roofs, private courtyards, and the UN school in Beit Lahiya. Many of them reignited when kicked or prodded, thereby exposing the white phosphorus to oxygen. When lit and smoking, they emitted a strong odor similar to garlic, which is typical of white phosphorus.
All of the white phosphorus shells that Human Rights Watch found came from the same lot manufactured in the United States in 1989 by Thiokol Aerospace, which was running the Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant at the time. In addition, on January 4, 2009, Reuters photographed IDF artillery units handling projectiles whose markings indicate that they were produced in the United States at the Pine Bluff Arsenal in September 1991.
Israel's willingness to investigate its use of white phosphorus is welcome, but history suggests that the likelihood of an objective examination is slim. Previous IDF investigations have failed to look objectively at alleged laws of war violations by Israeli soldiers and commanders. In the case of Operation Cast Lead, military investigators have already suggested that soldiers and commanders did no wrong, even before the investigations are complete.
"Commanders during the fighting shouldn't be losing sleep because of the investigations," said Col. Liron Liebman, who became head of the IDF's international law department after the major fighting ended in January. "It's impossible not to make mistakes in such a crowded environment, under pressure."[1] Colonel Liebman added that war crimes charges brought against Israeli soldiers and commanders are "legal terrorism."
The United States government, which supplied Israel with its white phosphorus munitions, should also conduct an investigation to determine whether Israel used it in violation of international humanitarian law.
Methodology
During major military operations, from December 27, 2008 to January 18, 2009, Israel banned access to Gaza for all media and human rights monitors. Access via Rafah in Egypt was also blocked. Unable to enter Gaza, Human Rights Watch researchers spent time on the Israeli side of the 1948 armistice line with northern Gaza. On January 9, 10 and 15, they watched IDF artillery repeatedly fire air-burst white phosphorus above civilian areas, including what appeared to be Gaza City and Jabalya. Israeli forces fired these shells from a 155mm artillery battery east of Highway 232 in Israel. The distinctive burst, sending burning wedges down, was consistent with media photographs taken since the start of the ground invasion on January 3. Barred by Israel from entry into Gaza, the researchers were unable to determine precisely where the white phosphorus landed and what effect it had on the civilian population.
Human Rights Watch researchers entered Gaza via the Rafah border crossing with Egypt on January 21, three days after major military operations had ceased, and spent the next 10 days investigating many of the sites where white phosphorus had been used, and the resultant harm to civilians and civilian objects. During this time, Human Rights Watch researchers conducted 29 interviews with the victims and witnesses of white phosphorus use, as well as with ambulance drivers and doctors who treated people with burns. Interviews with doctors who treated burn patients, as well as with another witness of a white phosphorus attack, were conducted in Cairo, Egypt on February 9 and 10.
On February 1, 2009 Human Rights Watch submitted a list of detailed questions about white phosphorus to the IDF, provided as an appendix to this report. On February 15 the IDF replied by letter, also an appendix, that it could not provide answers within the requested time-frame of two weeks. "The IDF has established an investigative team in the Southern Command to look into issues which you have raised, and our reply will be made on the basis of their findings," the letter said.

Lire l'intégralité du rapport en suivant le lien suivant: http://www.hrw.org/node/81760